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Abstract
We experimentally investigate in the laboratory two prominent mechanisms that are
employed in school choice programs to assign students to public schools. We study
how individual behavior is inﬂuenced by preference intensities and risk aversion. Our
main results show that (a) the Gale–Shapley mechanism is more robust to changes
in cardinal preferences than the Boston mechanism independently of whether indi-
viduals can submit a complete or only a restricted ranking of the schools and (b)
subjects with a higher degree of risk aversion are more likely to play “safer” strate-
gies under the Gale–Shapley but not under the Boston mechanism. Both results
have important implications for the eﬃciency and the stability of the mechanisms.
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11 Introduction
In school choice programs parents can express their preferences regarding the assignment
of their children to public schools. Abdulkadiro˘ glu and S¨ onmez [5] showed that promi-
nent assignment mechanisms in the US lacked eﬃciency, were manipulable, and/or had
other serious shortcomings that often led to lawsuits by unsatisﬁed parents. To overcome
these critical issues, Abdulkadiro˘ glu and S¨ onmez [5] took a mechanism design approach
and employed matching theory to propose alternative school choice mechanisms. Their
seminal paper triggered a rapidly growing literature that has looked into the design and
performance of assignment mechanisms. Simultaneously, several economists were invited
to meetings with the school district authorities of New York City and Boston to explore
possible ways to redesign the assignment procedures. It was decided to adopt variants
of the so–called deferred acceptance mechanism due to Gale and Shapley [14] (aka the
Gale–Shapley mechanism) in New York City and Boston as of 2004 and 2006, respec-
tively.1 Since many other US school districts still use variants of what was baptized the
“Boston” mechanism,2 it is not unlikely that these ﬁrst redesign decisions will lead to
similar adoptions elsewhere.3
Chen and S¨ onmez [10] turned to controlled laboratory experiments and compared the
performance of the Boston mechanism with the Gale–Shapley mechanism. One of their
main results is that the Gale–Shapley mechanism outperforms the Boston mechanism in
terms of eﬃciency. A few other experimental papers further studied the performance of
the mechanisms. In many real–life instances, parents are only allowed to submit a list
containing a limited number of schools. Calsamiglia, Haeringer, and Klijn [9] analyzed the
impact of imposing such a constraint and showed that, as a consequence, manipulation is
drastically increased and both eﬃciency and stability of the ﬁnal allocations are negatively
aﬀected. Another important issue concerns the level of information agents hold on the
preferences of the others. Pais and Pint´ er [21] focused on this comparing environments
where agents have complete information with environments where agents, while aware
of their own preferences, have no information at all about the preferences of their peers.
A diﬀerent approach was taken in Featherstone and Niederle [12], where agents may
not know the preferences of the others, but are aware of their underlying distribution.
Both papers studied how strategic behavior is aﬀected by the level of information agents
hold. Featherstone and Niederle [12] found that truth–telling rates of the two mechanisms
are very similar when agents receive information on the distribution of preferences, but
1Abdulkadiro˘ glu, Pathak, and Roth [2, 3] and Abdulkadiro˘ glu, Pathak, Roth, and S¨ onmez [4] reported
in more detail on their assistance and the key issues in the redesign for New York City and Boston,
respectively.
2That is, the mechanism employed in Boston before it was replaced by the Gale–Shapley mechanism.
3Interestingly, in March 2010 the San Francisco Board of Education approved an alternative mechanism
(based on Gale’s top trading cycles algorithm) for their new school choice system. For further recent
developments we refer to Al Roth’s blog on market design.
2do not know their exact realization. In the same vein, in Pais and Pint´ er [21], truth–
telling is higher under the Gale–Shapley mechanism only when information is substantial,
so that the Gale–Shapley mechanism outperforms the Boston mechanism only in some
informational settings.
The need of reassessing the school choice mechanisms is reinforced by the recent the-
oretical ﬁndings in Abdulkadiro˘ glu, Che, and Yasuda [1]. They showed that in typical
school choice environments the Boston mechanism Pareto dominates the Gale–Shapley
mechanism in ex ante welfare, which happens because the Boston mechanism induces
participants to reveal their cardinal preferences (i.e., their relative preference intensities)
whereas the Gale–Shapley mechanism does not.4 In view of this and other results Ab-
dulkadiro˘ glu et al. [1] cautioned against a hasty rejection of the Boston mechanism in
favor of mechanisms such as the Gale–Shapley mechanism.5
Motivated by these recent ﬁndings, we experimentally investigate how individual be-
havior in the Gale-Shapley and Boston mechanisms is inﬂuenced by preference intensities
and risk aversion. We opt for a stylized design that has several important advantages.
First, by letting subjects participate repeatedly in the same market with varying payoﬀs,
we are able to investigate the impact of preference intensities on individual behavior and
welfare. Second, a special feature of our laboratory experiment is that before subjects
participate in the matching markets they go through a ﬁrst phase in which they have
to make lottery choices. This allows us to see whether subjects with diﬀerent degrees of
risk aversion behave diﬀerently in the matching market. Third, the complete information
and the simple preference structure form an environment that can be thought through
by the subjects. Hence, clear theoretical predictions about how preference intensities
and risk aversion should aﬀect behavior can be made. Fourth, our setup purposely does
not include coarse school priorities in order to avoid possible problems in entangling the
causes of observed behavior.6 Finally, our experimental study also serves as a validation
device for results found in previous (less stylized) studies that are potentially closer to
practice but possibly not completely satisfactory in terms of identifying the motivation of
individual behavior.
Our main results are as follows. With respect to the eﬀect of relative preference
intensities, the simple economic intuition that subjects tend to list a school higher up
(lower down) in the submitted ranking if the payoﬀ of that particular school is increased
4On the other hand, the Gale–Shapley mechanism elicits truthful revelation of ordinal preferences
whereas the Boston mechanism does not.
5Miralles [19] drew a similar conclusion based on his analytical results and simulations.
6Coarse school priorities are a common feature of many school choice environments. Then, in order to
apply the assignment mechanisms, random tie–breaking rules are often used. However, the incorporation
of such rules in our design would make it very hard to see whether individuals with diﬀerent degrees of
risk aversion behave diﬀerently because of strategic uncertainty or because of the random tie–breaking
(see the discussion in Section 3). In other words, to study whether the behavioral eﬀect of risk aversion
is associated with strategic uncertainty we assume that the schools’ priority orders are strict.
3(decreased) everything else equal, can be veriﬁed. Since we also ﬁnd that every signiﬁcant
change in behavior provoked by variations in the preference intensity under the Gale–
Shapley also happens under the Boston mechanism and since there are some signiﬁcant
eﬀects that occur under the Boston but not under the Gale–Shapley mechanism, we
can conclude that the Gale–Shapley mechanism is more robust to changes in cardinal
preferences than the Boston mechanism (Result 1). Using the distribution of submitted
rankings, we then calculate the welfare properties of the mechanisms. We ﬁnd that the
Gale–Shapley mechanism tends to be more eﬃcient than the Boston mechanism in the
unconstrained setting but that Boston outperforms Gale–Shapley in the constrained case
(Result 2). Also, Gale–Shapley is more stable and “stability–robust” to changes in payoﬀs
than Boston (Result 3).
Next, we employ Tobit ML estimations to see whether individual behavior in the
matching market is correlated with the degree of risk aversion obtained from the lottery
choices. Our analysis shows that subjects with a higher degree of risk aversion are more
likely to play protective strategies7 if the Gale–Shapley mechanism is applied but not
when the Boston mechanism is used (Result 4). Finally, we divide our subject pool into
two subgroups —one subgroup containing all subjects who revealed a “high” degree of risk
aversion in the lottery choice phase and one subgroup containing the remaining subjects
(with a “low” degree of risk aversion)— and analyze how behavior within each of the
two subgroups is aﬀected by preference intensities. It turns out that the negative impact
of constraining the length of submittable rankings on eﬃciency and stability under the
Gale–Shapley mechanism is stronger for the highly risk averse (Result 5).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The experimental design is ex-
plained in Section 2. In Section 3 we derive hypotheses regarding the eﬀect of relative
preference intensities and risk aversion on strategic behavior. A ﬁrst preliminary analysis
of aggregate behavior and the impact of changes in cardinal preferences is given in Sec-
tion 4. In Section 5 we look into the levels of eﬃciency and stability obtained under the
mechanisms, as well as their responsiveness to changes in cardinal preferences. Section 6
is devoted to risk aversion. In Section 7 we conclude with some possible policy implica-
tions. Instructions and some additional Probit ML estimation results are relegated to the
Appendices.
2 Experimental Design and Procedures
Our experimental study comprises four diﬀerent treatments. Each treatment is divided
into two phases. In the ﬁrst phase, which is identical for all treatments, we elicit the
subjects’ degree of risk aversion using the paired lottery choice design introduced by Holt
7Loosely speaking, a subject plays a protective strategy if she protects herself from the worst eventu-
ality to the extent possible. Consequently, a protective strategy is a maximin strategy.
4and Laury [18].8 To be more concrete, subjects are given simultaneously ten diﬀerent
decision situations (see Table 1). In each of the ten situations, they have to choose one
of the two available lotteries.
Situation Option A Option B Diﬀerence
1 (1/10 of 2.00ECU, 9/10 of 1.60ECU) (1/10 of 3.85ECU, 9/10 of 0.10ECU) 1.17ECU
2 (2/10 of 2.00ECU, 8/10 of 1.60ECU) (2/10 of 3.85ECU, 8/10 of 0.10ECU) 0.83ECU
3 (3/10 of 2.00ECU, 7/10 of 1.60ECU) (3/10 of 3.85ECU, 7/10 of 0.10ECU) 0.50ECU
4 (4/10 of 2.00ECU, 6/10 of 1.60ECU) (4/10 of 3.85ECU, 6/10 of 0.10ECU) 0.16ECU
5 (5/10 of 2.00ECU, 5/10 of 1.60ECU) (5/10 of 3.85ECU, 5/10 of 0.10ECU) -0.18ECU
6 (6/10 of 2.00ECU, 4/10 of 1.60ECU) (6/10 of 3.85ECU, 4/10 of 0.10ECU) -0.51ECU
7 (7/10 of 2.00ECU, 3/10 of 1.60ECU) (7/10 of 3.85ECU, 3/10 of 0.10ECU) -0.85ECU
8 (8/10 of 2.00ECU, 2/10 of 1.60ECU) (8/10 of 3.85ECU, 2/10 of 0.10ECU) -1.18ECU
9 (9/10 of 2.00ECU, 1/10 of 1.60ECU) (9/10 of 3.85ECU, 1/10 of 0.10ECU) -1.52ECU
10 (10/10 of 2.00ECU, 0/10 of 1.60ECU) (10/10 of 3.85ECU, 0/10 of 0.10ECU) -1.85ECU
Table 1: The Holt and Laury [18] paired lottery choice design. For each of the ten decision situations, we also indicate
the expected payoﬀ diﬀerence between the two lotteries. Since we did not want to induce a focal point, subjects were not
informed about the expected payoﬀ diﬀerence during the experiment.
In the ﬁrst decision situation of Table 1, the less risky lottery (Option A) has a higher
expected payoﬀ than the more risky one (Option B). Hence, only very strong risk lovers
pick Option B in this situation. As we move further down the table, the expected payoﬀ
diﬀerence between the two lotteries decreases and eventually turns negative in situation
5. Consequently, risk neutral subjects prefer Option A in the ﬁrst four and Option B in
the last six decision situations. In the last decision situation, the subjects have to choose
between a sure payoﬀ of 2.00ECU (Option A) and a sure payoﬀ of 3.85ECU (Option B).
Since all rational individuals prefer the second option, all risk averse subjects will also have
switched by then from Option A to Option B. Finally, observe that rational individuals
switch from Option A to Option B at most once (they may always prefer Option B) but
never from Option B to Option A, and that the more risk averse an individual is the
further down the table she switches from Option A to B.
After subjects have decided which lottery to choose in each of the ten decision situ-
ations, they enter the second phase of the experiment in which they face the following
stylized school choice problem: There are three teachers (denoted by the natural numbers
1, 2, and 3) and three schools (denoted by the capital letters X, Y , and Z). Each school
has one open teaching position. The preferences of the teachers over schools and the
priority ordering of schools over teachers, both commonly known to all participants, are
8This procedure, called “multiple price list,” has been widely used. Recent applications include
Blavatskyy [8] and Heinemann, Nagel, and Ockenfels [17].
5presented in the following table.9
Preferences Priorities
Teacher 1 Teacher 2 Teacher 3 School X School Y School Z
Best match X Y Z 2 3 1
Second best match Y Z X 3 1 2
Worst match Z X Y 1 2 3
Table 2: Preferences of teachers over schools (left) and priority orderings of schools over teachers (right).
It can be seen from Table 2 that the preferences of the teachers form a Condorcet cycle.
The priority orderings of the schools form another Condorcet cycle in such a way that
every teacher is ranked last in her most preferred school, second in her second most
preferred school, and ﬁrst in her least preferred school. During the experiment, subjects
assume the role of teachers that seek to obtain a job at one of the schools. They receive
30ECU in case they end up in their most preferred school and 10ECU if they obtain a
job at their least preferred school. The payoﬀ of the second most preferred school is the
same for all participants but varies in the course of the second phase. Initially it is set at
20ECU, then it becomes 13ECU, and ﬁnally it is 27ECU.
The task of the subjects in the second phase is to submit a ranking over schools (not
necessarily the true preferences) to be used by a central clearinghouse to assign teachers
to schools. So, schools are not strategic players. We consider a total of four diﬀerent
treatment conditions (2 × 2–design) that are known to be empirically relevant in this
type of market. The ﬁrst treatment variable refers to the restrictions on the rankings
teachers can submit. We consider the unconstrained and one constrained setting. In the
unconstrained setting, teachers have to report a ranking over all three schools, while in
the constrained setting, they are only allowed to report the two schools they want to list
ﬁrst and second. The second treatment variable refers to how reported rankings are used
by the central clearinghouse to assign teachers to schools. We apply here both Gale–
Shapley’s deferred acceptance algorithm (GS) and the Boston algorithm (BOS). For the
particular school choice problem at hand, they are as follows:
Step 1. Each teacher sends an application to the school she listed ﬁrst in the ranking.
Step 2. Each school retains the applicant with the highest priority and rejects all other
applicants.
Step 3. Whenever a teacher is rejected at a school, she applies to the next highest listed
school.
9We “framed” the school choice problem for the parents from the point of view of teachers who are
looking for jobs because this presentation provides a natural environment that is easy to understand. For
example, material payoﬀs can be directly interpreted as salaries (see Pais and Pint´ er [21]).
6Step 4. The two algorithms diﬀer only in the way they treat new applications:
(GS) Whenever a school receives new applications, these applications are considered to-
gether with the previously retained application (if any). Among the retained and
the new applicants, the teacher with the highest priority is retained and all other
applicants are rejected.
(BOS) Whenever a school receives new applications, all of them are rejected in case the
school already retained an application before. In case the school did not retain an
application so far, it retains among all applicants the one with the highest priority
and all other applicants are rejected.
Step 5. The procedure described in Steps 3 and 4 is repeated until no more applications
can be rejected. Each teacher is ﬁnally assigned to the school that retains her application
at the end of the process. In case none of a teacher’s applications are retained at the
end of the process, which can only happen in the constrained mechanisms, she remains
unemployed and gets 0ECU.10
Combining the two treatment variables we obtain our four treatment conditions; the
Gale–Shapley unconstrained mechanism (abbreviated, GSu); the Boston unconstrained
mechanism (BOSu); the Gale–Shapley constrained mechanism (GSc); and, the Boston
constrained mechanism (BOSc).11 Also, to maintain the notation as simple as possible,
GSc27 will refer to the situation in treatment GSc where the payoﬀ of the second most
preferred school is 27ECU. All other situations are indicated accordingly.
The experiment was programmed within the z–Tree toolbox provided by Fischbacher
[13] and carried out in the computer laboratory at the Universitat Aut` onoma de Barcelona
between June and September 2009. We used the ORSEE registration system by Greiner
[15] to invite students from a wide range of faculties. In total, 218 undergraduates par-
ticipated in the experiment. We almost obtained a perfectly balanced distribution of
participants across treatments even though some students did not show up.
Each session proceeded as follows. At the beginning, each subject only received in-
structions for the ﬁrst phase (that included some control questions) together with an
oﬃcial payment receipt. Subjects could study the instructions at their own pace and any
doubts were privately clariﬁed. Participants were also informed that they would play af-
terwards a second phase, without providing any information about its structure. Subjects
also knew that their decisions in phase 1 would not aﬀect their payoﬀs in the other phase
10If teachers had to list only one school, the two constrained mechanisms would be identical; that
is, for all proﬁles of submitted (degenerate) rankings, the same matching would be obtained under the
Gale–Shapley and Boston algorithms.
11The instructions, which are translated from Spanish, can be found in Appendix A. It is well–known
(Dubins and Freedman [11] and Roth [22]) that teachers have incentives to report their ordinal preferences
truthfully in treatment GSu. Since we wanted to put all four treatments at the same level, these incentives
were neither directly revealed in the instructions nor were they indirectly taught by going over several
examples.
7(to avoid possible hedging across phases) and that they would not receive any information
regarding the decisions of any other player until the end of the session (so that they could
not condition their actions in the second phase on the behavior of other participants in
the ﬁrst phase). In theory, therefore, the two phases are independent from each other.
After completing the ﬁrst phase, subjects were anonymously matched into groups of
three (within each group, one subject became teacher 1, one subject teacher 2, and one
subject teacher 3) and entered the second phase of the experiment, where they faced one of
the four matching protocols. The roles within the groups remained the same throughout
the second phase. Subjects were informed that three diﬀerent school choice problems
would be played sequentially under the same matching protocol within the same group,
but they did not know how the parameters would change in the course of the second
phase. It was also made clear that no information regarding the co–players’ decisions,
the induced matching, or the resulting payoﬀs would be revealed at any point in time.
No feedback whatsoever was provided. Apart from avoiding issues with learning, this
prevented subjects from conditioning their decisions on former actions of other group
members. We informed subjects about the ﬁrst payoﬀ constellation (the salary at the
second school is 20ECU) in the instructions. The case in which the second school pays
13ECU (27ECU) was always played second (last). When playing the second school choice
game, subjects had no information regarding the parameters in the third game.
To prevent income eﬀects, either phase 1 or 2 was payoﬀ relevant (one participant
determined the payoﬀ relevant phase by throwing a fair coin at the end of the experiment),
which was known by the subjects from the beginning. If the ﬁrst phase was payoﬀ relevant,
the computer selected randomly one of the ten decision situations. Given the randomly
selected decision situation, the uncertainty in the lottery chosen by the subject then
resolved in order to determine the ﬁnal payoﬀ. If the second phase was payoﬀ relevant,
the computer randomly selected one of the three payoﬀ constellations. Subjects were
then paid according to the matching induced by the strategy proﬁle for that particular
payoﬀ constellation. At the end of the experiment, subjects were informed about the
payoﬀ relevant situation and their ﬁnal payoﬀ. Subjects received 4Euro (40Eurocents)
per ECU in case the ﬁrst (second) phase was payoﬀ relevant. These numbers were chosen
to induce similar expected payoﬀs. A typical session lasted about 75 minutes and subjects
earned on average 12.21Euro (including a 3Euro show–up fee) for their participation.
3 Experimental Hypotheses
In this section, we derive our experimental hypotheses regarding the eﬀects of preference
intensities and risk aversion. Since the school choice problem is set up symmetrically, the
three teachers face exactly the same decision problem and we can simplify the description
of the strategy spaces. For instance, in the unconstrained setting we will make use of the
8notation (2,1,3) for the ranking where a teacher lists her second most preferred school
ﬁrst, her most preferred school second, and her least preferred school last. The other ﬁve
strategies (1,2,3), (1,3,2), (2,3,1), (3,1,2), and (3,2,1) have similar interpretations. Also,
even though subjects are restricted to list only two schools in the constrained setting, the
strategy space has the same cardinality as in the unconstrained setting and in fact the
same notation can be used. For example, the notation (1,2,3) then means that the subject
lists her ﬁrst school ﬁrst, her second school second, and that she does not apply to her
last school. Finally, note that for all four mechanisms the strategies (3,1,2) and (3,2,1) are
strategically equivalent; that is, they always yield the same payoﬀ independently of the
behavior of the other group members (they yield a payoﬀ of 10ECU for sure). Although
possibly not all subjects were aware of the strategic equivalence of (3,1,2) and (3,2,1),
we nevertheless decided to pool these two strategies in our analysis through the notation
(3,×,×).
With respect to the question of which strategies could be observed, we note that
rational subjects do not play dominated strategies. Proposition 1 derives the set of un-
dominated strategies for each of the four mechanisms we employ.
Proposition 1 The sets of undominated strategies are as follows: 12
Mechanism Rankings
(1,2,3) (1,3,2) (2,1,3) (2,3,1) (3,×,×)
Gale–Shapley unconstrained ×
Gale–Shapley constrained × × ×
Boston unconstrained × ×
Boston constrained × × × × ×
We describe the underlying intuition of Proposition 1.13 It is well–known that the Gale–
Shapley mechanism is strategy–proof in the unconstrained setting (see Dubins and Freed-
man [11] and Roth [22]); that is, it never hurts to report preferences truthfully. One easily
veriﬁes that with our particular proﬁle of priorities any other strategy gives a strictly lower
payoﬀ for some submittable rankings of the other two players. Therefore the only undom-
inated strategy in GSu is truth–telling. With respect to treatment GSc, Haeringer and
Klijn [16] showed that it never pays to report a constrained ranking where the two listed
schools are reversed with respect to the true preferences. In fact, one readily veriﬁes that
in our particular situation (i.e., priority proﬁle) the three strategies that “respect” the
true binary relations are the only undominated strategies.
Regarding BOSu, it never hurts to report school 3 —one’s truly last school— last
because the worst thing that can happen is ending up in that school. Since acceptance
12A strategy is undominated under a mechanism if and only if the corresponding entry is ×.
13A formal proof is available from the authors upon request.
9is no longer deferred, there are submittable rankings of the other two players for which
it is strictly better to report the ranking (2,1,3) than (1,2,3). Indeed, some simple but
tedious calculations show that these two strategies are the only undominated strategies in
BOSu. Finally, in BOSc, acceptance is not deferred, and in addition there is a constraint
on the length of submittable rankings. In this environment it can actually be better to
report a lower ranked school above a higher ranked one. As a consequence all strategies
are undominated in this treatment.
Our prediction about how variations in the cardinal preference structure aﬀect indi-
vidual behavior in the matching market is as follows.
Prediction 1 Subjects no longer list school 2 or list school 2 further down in their sub-
mitted ranking if the payoﬀ of this school decreases from 20ECU to 13ECU. Similarly,
subjects no longer exclude school 2 from their submitted ranking or list school 2 further
up in their ranking if the payoﬀ of this school increases from 20ECU to 27ECU.
The economic intuition behind this prediction is fairly simple. Whenever the payoﬀ of a
school decreases everything else equal, its relative attractiveness decreases. Consequently,
subjects who originally rank school 2 above some other school(s) may decide to push it
further down their ranking or not list it at all. A symmetric argument applies if the payoﬀ
of school 2 is increased. Combining Proposition 1 and Prediction 1 we obtain Table 3,
which reﬂects our hypothesis of how the use of undominated strategies changes due to
variations in cardinal preferences.
Mechanism Rankings
(1,2,3) (1,3,2) (2,1,3) (2,3,1) (3,×,×)
Gale–Shapley unconstrained
Change from 20 to 13ECU =
Change from 20 to 27ECU =
Gale–Shapley constrained
Change from 20 to 13ECU − + −
Change from 20 to 27ECU + − +
Boston unconstrained
Change from 20 to 13ECU + −
Change from 20 to 27ECU − +
Boston constrained
Change from 20 to 13ECU ? + − − +
Change from 20 to 27ECU ? − + + −
Table 3: Hypothesis about how preference intensities aﬀect the play of undominated strategies.
We explain the hypothesis for each mechanism for the case when the payoﬀ of the
second school is reduced from 20ECU to 13ECU (the argument regarding an increase
to 27ECU is similar). We ﬁrst consider the Gale–Shapley mechanism. There should not
10be any eﬀect in treatment GSu, simply because truth–telling is the only undominated
strategy for this mechanism. In treatment GSc, only the strategies (1,2,3), (1,3,2), and
(2,3,1) are undominated. Subjects who initially played (1,3,2) will also do so after the
reduction of the payoﬀ of school 2. Also, subjects who initially told the truth may change
to play (1,3,2) instead. Finally, subjects who initially played (2,3,1) could be tempted
to play (3,2,1) or (3,1,2), as suggested by our prediction. However, these strategies are
dominated by (2,3,1) and (1,3,2), respectively. Hence, if a subject who initially played
(2,3,1) changes her strategy, then we expect her to play (1,3,2). So, when the second
school pays 13ECU the strategies (1,2,3) and (2,3,1) will be played less often and (1,3,2)
more often compared to the situation where the second schools pays 20ECU.
We now consider the Boston mechanism. According to Proposition 1, only the strate-
gies (1,2,3) and (2,1,3) are undominated in BOSu. Clearly, every individual who told the
truth under the original payoﬀs will still prefer to tell the truth when the payoﬀ of school
2 is reduced. On the other hand, subjects who initially played the strategy (2,1,3) may
switch to telling the truth. Hence, our hypothesis states that the change in the payoﬀs
makes subjects report more often the ranking (1,2,3) and less often the ranking (2,1,3).
Finally, we consider BOSc. Here, every strategy is undominated. Similarly to GSc, sub-
jects who initially played (1,3,2) will also do so after the reduction of the payoﬀ, and
subjects who initially told the truth may change to play (1,3,2) instead. Individuals who
submitted the ranking (3,×,×) opted for the school that guarantees access and hence a
payoﬀ reduction of school 2 should not aﬀect their choice. However, subjects who initially
chose (2,3,1) may now submit the riskless strategy (3,×,×) so that this strategy could
be played more often after the reduction of the payoﬀ. Finally, subjects who initially
played (2,1,3) could possibly change to (1,2,3) or (1,3,2). All in all, strategies (1,3,2) and
(3,×,×) will be played more often, and strategies (2,1,3) and (2,3,1) will be played less
often. Since there are two opposite eﬀects regarding strategy (1,2,3), we do not make a
prediction regarding the change in truth–telling.
The ﬁrst phase of the experiment gives us the possibility to explain behavior in the
matching market in terms of the subjects’ attitude towards risk. Since the subjects receive
full information about individual preferences, priorities, and payoﬀs and, also, the four
mechanisms do not include any randomness, the only source of uncertainty is strategic:
Subjects have to form subjective beliefs about the other group members’ strategies. So,
for instance they have to ponder the economic beneﬁts from working at their top school
against the probability that another subject with a higher priority for that school applies
and grabs the slot. To develop a prediction regarding the behavior of highly risk averse
subjects, we make use of the concept of protective strategies provided in Barber` a and
Dutta [6].14 Loosely speaking, when an agent has no information about the others’ sub-
14Two settings in which protective strategies have been studied are two-sided matching markets (Bar-
ber` a and Dutta [7]) and, more recently, paired kidney exchange (Nicol` o and Rodr´ ıguez-Alv´ arez [20]).
11mitted preferences, she behaves in a protective way if she plays a strategy so as to protect
herself from the worst eventuality to the extent possible. In our setup this means, for any
distribution over the others’ strategy proﬁles: First, choosing a strategy that guarantees
access to a school; second, among these, if possible, one that maximizes the probability
of obtaining school 1 or 2; and ﬁnally, within this set of strategies and whenever possible,
picking one that maximizes the probability of being matched to school 1.
Prediction 2 Highly risk averse subjects tend to employ protective strategies in the match-
ing market.
We can easily check Prediction 2 since protective strategies in our matching market can
readily be calculated. In fact, since under GSu telling the truth never hurts and, for some
strategy proﬁles of the others, leads to a better school slot, truth–telling is the unique
protective strategy under this mechanism.15 In contrast, under BOSu, a subject gains by
manipulating the true preferences and submitting (2,1,3) against some complementary
preference proﬁles, while, against others, she ends up better oﬀ by submitting the true
preferences. This, together with the fact that by ranking school 3 at the bottom of the
list, the subject reduces the set of complementary proﬁles for which she is assigned to her
lowest ranked option, explains why (1,2,3) and (2,1,3) are (the only) protective strategies
under BOSu.
In what constrained mechanisms are concerned, protective behavior ensures in the ﬁrst
place that a subject is not left unassigned for any proﬁle of complementary strategies. This
implies using strategy (3,×,×) under BOSc —the unique protective strategy under this
mechanism— and, given that acceptance is deferred in GSc, ranking school 3 ﬁrst or
second in the list under this mechanism. Moreover, given that ranking school 3 second
increases the chances of being assigned to a school better than 3, both (1,3,2) and (2,3,1)
are protective. We summarize this in Proposition 2.16
Proposition 2 The sets of protective strategies are as follows: 17
Mechanism Rankings
(1,2,3) (1,3,2) (2,1,3) (2,3,1) (3,×,×)
Gale–Shapley unconstrained ×
Gale–Shapley constrained × ×
Boston unconstrained × ×
Boston constrained ×
15Barber` a and Dutta [6] showed that under GSu truth–telling is the unique protective strategy for all
participants on both sides of a two-sided matching market.
16A formal proof is available from the authors upon request.
17A given strategy is protective under a given mechanism if and only if the corresponding entry is ×.
124 Preference Intensities
In this section, we present aggregate data and analyze how the empirical distribution of
submitted rankings changes according to the applied cardinal preferences.
Mechanism Submitted Rankings
(1,2,3) (1,3,2) (2,1,3) (2,3,1) (3,×,×)
Gale–Shapley unconstrained
20 ECU 0.5000 0.0000 0.4074 0.0370 0.0556
13 ECU 0.6481 0.0370 0.1852 0.0185 0.1110
27 ECU 0.4444 0.0000 0.4259 0.0741 0.0555
Gale–Shapley constrained
20 ECU 0.2407 0.1852 0.1481 0.3148 0.1110
13 ECU 0.1667 0.3148 0.0926 0.2778 0.1482
27 ECU 0.2037 0.1296 0.2593 0.3148 0.0926
Boston unconstrained
20 ECU 0.4000 0.0182 0.4000 0.1636 0.0182
13 ECU 0.6182 0.0364 0.1455 0.0727 0.1273
27 ECU 0.3091 0.0000 0.5455 0.0909 0.0545
Boston constrained
20 ECU 0.2727 0.2000 0.1455 0.2545 0.1272
13 ECU 0.1818 0.3636 0.1273 0.1636 0.1636
27 ECU 0.1455 0.0545 0.2727 0.4364 0.0909
Table 4: Probability distribution of submitted rankings. The most salient rankings for a given mechanism and cardinal
preferences are indicated in boldface.
It can be seen from Table 4 that the most salient ranking is always an undominated
strategy. It follows from inspection of column (1,2,3) that for each payoﬀ constellation
and among all four mechanisms, the level of truth–telling is highest in GSu. This is
not a surprise because it is the only mechanism for which truth–telling is the unique
undominated strategy (Proposition 1). However, since the level of truth–telling falls well
short of 100% in this treatment as well, several subjects did not recognize that it is in
their best interest to reveal preferences honestly.18
Now, we study the impact of cardinal preferences on individual behavior. The rele-
vant data is provided in Table 5, which shows the percentage changes in the probability
18In Chen and S¨ onmez [10], in their “random” and “designed” treatments of GSu, 56% and 72% of the
subjects, respectively, submitted their true preferences. The numbers are 58% and 57% in Calsamiglia et
al. [9]. Our numbers seem to be slightly lower but a real comparison is not possible due to the very diﬀerent
environments. Using χ2 tests for homogeneity one veriﬁes that for all cardinal payoﬀ constellations, (a)
the distribution of submitted rankings in treatment GSu (BOSu) is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the one
in treatment GSc (BOSc) and (b) the distributions of submitted rankings in treatments GSu and BOSu
(GSc and BOSc) are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other. This might create the impression that
subjects in treatment GSu (GSc) interpreted the matching algorithm in the same way as the subjects
in treatment BOSu (BOSc). However, Results 1 and 4 presented later on clearly show that the two
mechanisms are perceived diﬀerently.
13distribution of submitted rankings when the payoﬀ of the second school decreases from
20 to 13ECU (top part of the table) and when it increases from 20 to 27ECU (bottom
part of the table). For the sake of completeness, we also present the p–values of the χ2
tests for homogeneity that analyze whether the respective distributions diﬀer.19
Mechanism Rankings p–value
(1,2,3) (1,3,2) (2,1,3) (2,3,1) (3,×,×)
20 ECU – 13 ECU
Gale–Shapley unconstrained -0.1481 -0.0370 0.2222 0.0185 -0.0555 0.0300
Gale–Shapley constrained 0.0741 -0.1296 0.0556 0.0370 -0.0370 0.2300
Boston unconstrained -0.2182 -0.0182 0.2545 0.0909 -0.1091 0.0002
Boston constrained 0.0909 -0.1636 0.0182 0.0909 -0.0364 0.1450
20 ECU – 27 ECU
Gale–Shapley unconstrained 0.0556 0.0000 -0.0185 -0.0370 0.0000 0.4650
Gale–Shapley constrained 0.0370 0.0556 -0.1111 0.0000 0.0185 0.3300
Boston unconstrained 0.0909 0.0182 -0.1455 0.0727 -0.0364 0.1400
Boston constrained 0.1273 0.1455 -0.1273 -0.1818 0.0364 0.0100
Table 5: Changes in the probability distribution of submitted rankings. A positive (negative) number indicates that the
corresponding ranking is used more (less) often when the payoﬀ is 20ECU. We also present the one–sided p–value of the
χ2 test for homogeneity that analyzes whether the empirical distribution depends on the relative preference intensities.
We see that a reduction of the payoﬀ of school 2 from 20 to 13ECU changes the
distribution of submitted rankings in the unconstrained but not in the constrained setting,
while raising its payoﬀ from 20 to 27ECU only aﬀects the distributions in BOSc. To
analyze these ﬁndings in more detail, we run Wilcoxon signed–rank tests as they allow us
to see whether the use of a particular ranking changes.
First, we discuss signiﬁcant changes in behavior related to the reduction of the payoﬀ
of school 2. With respect to the unconstrained mechanisms, we ﬁnd that the reduction
makes subjects use the strategy (2,1,3) signiﬁcantly less often (p = 0.0163 in GSu and
p = 0.0053 in BOSu), while, at the same time, subjects also tell the truth signiﬁcantly
more often (p = 0.0007 in GSu and p = 0.0003 in BOSu). These results have only
been predicted for BOSu because telling the truth is the unique undominated strategy in
GSu. We also ﬁnd that in treatment BOSu, the ranking (2,3,1) is submitted signiﬁcantly
less (p = 0.0294) and the rankings (3,×,×) signiﬁcantly more often (p = 0.0072) after
the change of payoﬀs. Although according to Proposition 1 neither of the two strategies
should have been used at all, it seems “natural” that some of the subjects who did not
realize that these strategies are dominated switch from the ranking (2,3,1) to (3,×,×) as
the payoﬀ of school 2 decreases (as indicated by our ﬁrst prediction). With respect to the
constrained mechanisms, we ﬁnd the same signiﬁcant eﬀect for both GSc and BOSc: The
strategy (1,3,2) is applied more often after the change (p = 0.0261 in GSc and p = 0.0145
19Throughout the analysis, p–values are one–sided.
14in BOSc), which is in line with our hypothesis. So, all signiﬁcant changes that take place
under the Gale–Shapley mechanism also occur under the Boston mechanism. Moreover,
there is no signiﬁcant change in the submitted rankings that is in the opposite direction
to that of Prediction 1.
Second, we discuss signiﬁcant changes in the probability distribution of submitted
rankings that are due to an increase of the payoﬀ of school 2 from 20 to 27ECU. It can
be seen from the bottom part of Table 5 that individual behavior is mainly aﬀected in
the Boston treatments. More precisely, in BOSu, the ranking (2,1,3) is submitted more
often after increasing the payoﬀ of school 2 (p = 0.0105). Similarly, in treatment BOSc,
subjects play less often the strategies (1,2,3) (p = 0.0354) and (1,3,2) (p = 0.0105), and
they use more frequently the strategies (2,1,3) (p = 0.0354) and (2,3,1) (p = 0.0092) after
the payoﬀ has been changed. Observe that none of the signiﬁcant changes regarding the
Boston mechanism goes against our hypothesis. Finally, since the only signiﬁcant eﬀect
in the Gale–Shapley treatments is that subjects submit the ranking (2,1,3) more often
(p = 0.0289) after increasing the payoﬀ of school 2 under GSc, it is again the case that
all changes in behavior caused by the variation in cardinal preferences under the Gale–
Shapley mechanism also take place under the Boston mechanism. Consequently, we can
summarize our ﬁndings as follows.
Result 1 (Cardinal preferences.) The Gale–Shapley mechanism is more robust to
changes in cardinal preferences than the Boston mechanism, independently of whether
choice is constrained or unconstrained.
5 Performance: Eﬃciency and Stability
Two prominent indicators of the performance of matching mechanisms are eﬃciency and
stability. While eﬃciency for teachers is the primary welfare goal,20 stability of the match-
ings reached should be met for the mechanism to be “successful.”21 In our setup, a
matching is blocked if there is a teacher that prefers to be assigned to some school with a
slot that is either available or occupied by a lower priority teacher. A matching is stable
if it is not blocked. An important advantage of our simple environment is that we can
actually compare the diﬀerent mechanisms on these two important dimensions directly,
i.e., without recurring to (virtual) recombinations and estimations.22
20For eﬃciency we only consider the welfare of the teachers as the school slots are mere objects.
21Stability is important to avoid potential lawsuits or the appearance of matches that circumvent the
mechanism.
22Since we have the empirical distributions over all strategies, a suﬃcient number of recombinations
will ensure that the diﬀerence between any two mechanisms under consideration is signiﬁcant.
155.1 Eﬃciency
To determine the levels of eﬃciency, we ﬁrst calculate the likelihood of every proﬁle of
submitted preference rankings from the empirical distributions over all possible strategies
presented in Table 4. For each such proﬁle, we then determine the induced matching
and the corresponding payoﬀ per teacher. Actual eﬃciency is ﬁnally computed as the
expected average payoﬀ per teacher. To be able to make comparisons across diﬀerent
cardinal preferences under the same mechanism, we also present normalized eﬃciency,
which is obtained by setting the payoﬀ of school 2 to 20ECU independently of its actual
value. The results are depicted in Table 6.
Mechanism 20ECU 13ECU 27ECU
actual norm. actual norm.
Gale–Shapley unconstrained 21.1024 19.6129 22.6871 26.2672 20.6662
Gale–Shapley constrained 17.4156 14.8776 16.7522 21.6409 17.7509
Boston unconstrained 20.6802 20.1506 22.1641 25.3526 20.1635
Boston constrained 18.0584 16.2921 18.2426 22.9131 17.8447
Table 6: Expected average payoﬀ per teacher in ECU. For the cases where the payoﬀ of the second most preferred school
is 13ECU or 27ECU, we indicate both actual and normalized eﬃciency.
Our ﬁrst observation is that for both the Gale–Shapley and the Boston mechanisms,
the expected payoﬀ per teacher is always higher in the unconstrained setting than in the
constrained setting, which reaﬃrms the ﬁndings in Calsamiglia et al. [9]. More interest-
ingly, payoﬀs under the Boston mechanism are not always lower than those under the
Gale–Shapley mechanism. In fact, whereas the Gale–Shapley has the tendency to create
a higher welfare than the Boston mechanism in the unconstrained case, it turns out that
eﬃciency is always higher in BOSc than in GSc.
Two elements contribute to the observed diﬀerences across mechanisms. First, the
mechanisms produce diﬀerent outcomes for some strategy proﬁles. This can be accounted
for by looking at the actual eﬃciency levels when the same distribution of strategy proﬁles
is applied to the Gale–Shapley and Boston mechanisms. Second, even though neither GSu
and BOSu nor GSc and BOSc induce signiﬁcantly diﬀerent distributions of submitted
rankings,23 slight changes in individual behavior across mechanisms have an impact on
eﬃciency. For instance, BOSu20 yields a higher average payoﬀ than GSu20, independently
of the exact (common) distribution of strategy proﬁles.24 This strongly suggests that the
observed diﬀerence in actual eﬃciency between these two treatments relies exclusively
on those slight diﬀerences in behavior and, in fact, an inspection of Table 4 reveals that
the proportion of truth–telling under GSu20 is higher than under BOSu20. Gale–Shapley’s
23See Footnote 18.
24The slightly cumbersome calculations are available from the authors upon request.
16advantage in truth-telling is also partially responsible for the eﬃciency advantage of GSu27
over BOSu27, whereas a less pronounced diﬀerence when school 2 is worth 13ECU is not
enough to compensate for an a priori eﬃciency advantage of BOS over GS.25 In what the
constrained mechanisms are concerned, both elements are again important in explaining
the observed diﬀerences in eﬃciency. BOS exhibits an eﬃciency advantage over GS when
the uniform distribution over strategy proﬁles is considered.26 In addition, whereas GSc
and BOSc lead to roughly the same strategic choices when school 2 is worth 20ECU,
diﬀerences are more pronounced for the other payoﬀ constellations, resulting in a visible
eﬃciency advantage of BOSc over GSc.
Result 2 (Eﬃciency.) Imposing a constraint reduces eﬃciency. Moreover, GSu tends
to outperform BOSu, but BOSc outperforms GSc. Finally, increasing the payoﬀ of school
2 leads to a reduction of eﬃciency, except for GSc.
5.2 Stability
Table 7 contains the total proportion of stable matchings reached given the empirical
distribution of submitted rankings in each treatment (in boldface), split into the three
stable matchings labeled teacher optimal, compromise, and school optimal. Under each of
these symmetric matchings, every teacher is assigned to its most preferred, second most
preferred, and least preferred school, respectively.
We can see that, for every mechanism, the frequency of the compromise stable match-
ing increases sharply as the payoﬀ of school 2 rises. Under GSc, this is obtained mainly
at the expense of the school optimal stable matching —valued at 10ECU per teacher—
thus resulting in an improvement in eﬃciency, whereas under both GSu and BOSu, ef-
ﬁciency decreases as the teacher optimal stable matching —worth 30ECU per teacher—
is reached far less often. Simultaneously, the proportion of stable matchings reached as
a whole increases. Under BOSc, the increase in the proportion of the compromise stable
matching rests mainly on the number of unstable matchings, boosting stability as the
payoﬀ of school 2 increases.
When comparing diﬀerent treatments for the same payoﬀ constellation, the numbers
suggest that imposing a constraint signiﬁcantly reduces the probability of obtaining a
stable matching. The same result was obtained in Calsamiglia et al. [9] for the Gale–
Shapley mechanism. On the other hand, Gale–Shapley is in general more successful than
Boston in producing stable matchings. This is in line with theory in the unconstrained
25By this we mean that, in our setup, the average eﬃciency level when the uniform distribution over
strategy proﬁles is considered is higher under BOS, reaching 14.81ECU and 19.08ECU under BOSu13
and BOSu27, respectively, against 13.76ECU under GSu13 and 17.07ECU under GSu27.
26The average eﬃciency level for the uniform distribution over strategy proﬁles is 14.91ECU,
13.03ECU, and 16.79ECU under BOS and 14.58ECU, 12.93ECU, and 16.24ECU under GS when
school 2 is valued 20, 13, and 27ECU, respectively.
17Mechanism Payoﬀ second most preferred school
20ECU 13ECU 27ECU
Gale–Shapley unconstrained 0.8571 0.7196 0.8629
Teacher optimal 0.1250 0.3216 0.0878
Compromise 0.7173 0.3458 0.7545
School optimal 0.0148 0.0522 0.0205
Gale–Shapley constrained 0.5505 0.4944 0.5934
Teacher optimal 0.0773 0.1116 0.0370
Compromise 0.3344 0.1503 0.4621
School optimal 0.1388 0.2324 0.0943
Boston unconstrained 0.6558 0.4491 0.6760
Teacher optimal 0.0731 0.2805 0.0295
Compromise 0.5775 0.1039 0.6333
School optimal 0.0051 0.0647 0.0132
Boston constrained 0.3441 0.3089 0.6034
Teacher optimal 0.1056 0.1622 0.0080
Compromise 0.1949 0.0708 0.5760
School optimal 0.0435 0.0759 0.0194
Table 7: Proportions of stable matchings, split into the teacher optimal, the compromise, and the school optimal stable
matchings.
case —since Gale–Shapley produces stable matchings when subjects are truthful, whereas
Boston does not— and again with Calsamiglia et al. [9]. Finally, note that when the
magnitude of the changes in the proportion of stable matchings is taken into account,
it appears to be the case that, very much in resemblance to Result 1, the Gale–Shapley
mechanism is less sensitive to changes in the payoﬀ of school 2 than the Boston mechanism.
In fact, when comparing the percentage of stable matchings reached when school 2 is
worth 13 and 27ECU, diﬀerences in stability reach 0.1433 and 0.0990 under GSu and
GSc, respectively, against 0.2269 and 0.2945 under BOSu and BOSc.
Result 3 (Stability.) Imposing a constraint reduces stability. Moreover, GS is more
stable and “stability–robust” to changes in payoﬀs than BOS. Finally, increasing the
payoﬀ of school 2 increases stability, mainly due to the compromise stable matching.
6 Risk Aversion
In this section, we analyze whether subjects with diﬀerent degrees of risk aversion —
proxied by the switching point in the paired lottery choice phase— behave diﬀerently in
the matching market and whether this depends on the actual mechanism employed. To
investigate this question, we study how the distribution of submitted rankings changes
as the subjects with the lowest switching point in the paired lottery choice phase are
eliminated step–by–step from our subject pool. This procedure can be readily described
18as follows: We start by considering the distribution of submitted rankings for the whole
subject pool. Then, in the ﬁrst step of the process, we analyze how this distribution
changes as we eliminate from our subject pool all those subjects who, in the ﬁrst phase
of the experiment, switch from Option A to Option B in the ﬁrst decision situation.27
In the second step of the process, we eliminate from our subject pool all those subjects
who switch from Option A to Option B in the second decision situation. This process
continues until we are only left with the subjects who switch earliest in the ninth decision
situation, i.e., the most risk averse agents. The advantage of this procedure is that it
does not only allow us to determine if individual behavior depends on risk aversion, but
it also enables us to establish the degree of risk aversion from which on behavior diﬀers.
The relevant data is presented in Figure 1. It consists of four panels, one for each treat-
ment. In every panel, the horizontal axis indicates switching points in the paired lottery
choice phase. On the vertical axis, we plot the percentage with which the subjects who
have a switching point that is at least as high as the number indicated on the horizontal
axis play any of the ﬁve possible strategies. As we move from the left to the right in a
given graph, the subjects with the lowest risk aversion among all those still considered are
discarded. This procedure has the potential drawback that the distributions of rankings
for high switching points are likely to be determined by only a few subjects. Indeed, it
turns out that in each treatment, less than ten subjects have a switching point in the
paired lottery choice phase of at least 9. To minimize this problem and to provide a clear
visual representation, we opted for pooling the data of all three payoﬀ constellations.
We now discuss the graphs for each of the four mechanisms. Intuitively, the ﬁgure
should be looked at in the following way: If a curve is ﬂat, then the use of that particular
strategy in that particular mechanism does not depend on the degree of risk aversion. On
the other hand, if a curve is increasing (decreasing), then the corresponding strategy is
used more (less) by the subjects with a higher degree of risk aversion. Our ﬁrst general
observation is that all curves are rather ﬂat until a switching point of 7 in the paired
lottery choice phase.
It can be seen in Table 4 that, in treatment GSu, subjects predominantly say the
truth or play the strategy (2,1,3). Truth–telling is the unique protective strategy for
this mechanism (Proposition 2) and we indeed see that it is played considerably more
often among the highly risk averse subjects. For example, the percentage of truth–telling
increases from 0.6000 for a switching point of 7 to 0.8000 if the selected switching point
is 9, while the corresponding percentage for (2,1,3) decreases from 0.3733 to 0.1300. The
graph for treatment GSc also provides clear evidence in favor of our hypothesis that
subjects with a higher degree of risk aversion play “safer” strategies more frequently.
27We consider this to be the ﬁrst step because there is no subject who always chooses Option B.
Observe that all subjects who behave inconsistently —that is, the individuals who switch at least once

































































































































Figure 1: The distribution of submitted rankings for all four mechanisms as the subjects with lowest degree of risk aversion
are eliminated step–by–step from the subject pool. We took the average over all payoﬀ constellations.
In this treatment, the use of the protective strategy (2,3,1) increases from 0.3492 for a
switching point of 7 to 0.6667 if the selected switching point is 9. The curve for (1,3,2),
the second protective strategy, is initially increasing and decreases sharply for switching
points higher than 8. The curves for the remaining three strategies, on the other hand,
are downward sloping.
Our ﬁndings for the Boston mechanism are more mixed. In treatment BOSu, subjects
mainly submit either of the protective rankings (1,2,3) and (2,1,3), and, among the two,
the highly risk averse subjects rather tend to say the truth. The main diﬀerence with
respect to GSu is that the dominated rankings (2,3,1) and (3,×,×) are now also submitted
to some lesser extent, and the graph shows that the highly risk averse subjects use more
often the “safety” strategy (3,×,×) and less often the strategy (2,3,1) than their co–
players. Finally, in treatment BOSc, all ﬁve strategies are submitted independently of
the degree of risk aversion and it is diﬃcult to identify any clear pattern. If anything,
the strategies (1,2,3) and (2,1,3) are played more and the strategies (1,3,2), (2,3,1), and
(3,×,×) are played less by the highly risk averse subjects. In any case, our hypothesis
20that the unique protective strategy (3,×,×) will be played more often by the subjects
with high risk aversion cannot be validated.
Next, we complement the previous general discussion with an econometric analysis.
We regress the probability with which a particular ranking is submitted (again the pooled
data for all three payoﬀ constellations is considered) on a constant and the switching
point extracted in the ﬁrst phase of the experiment.28 The parameter estimates of the
Tobit Maximum Likelihood estimation procedure for the switching point are presented in
Table 8. The errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Mechanism Rankings Observations
(1,2,3) (1,3,2) (2,1,3) (2,3,1) (3,×,×)
Gale–Shapley unconstrained 0.0587∗∗ −0.0033 −0.0056 −0.0021 −0.0474∗∗ 48
(0.0269) (0.0034) (0.0263) (0.0065) (0.0215)
Gale–Shapley constrained −0.0330 0.0263∗ −0.0332 0.0448∗∗ −0.0048 49
(0.0238) (0.0173) (0.0247) (0.0251) (0.0119)
Boston unconstrained 0.0083 −0.0166∗∗ 0.0001 −0.0027 0.0108 51
(0.0270) (0.0099) (0.0267) (0.0156) (0.0181)
Boston constrained 0.0012 −0.0332∗ 0.0369∗ 0.0087 −0.0137 48
(0.0307) (0.0188) (0.0225) (0.0240) (0.0221)
Table 8: Tobit ML estimation results on how risk aversion aﬀects behavior in the matching market. Standard errors are
in parentheses. Errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. ∗ Signiﬁcant at the 10–percent level. ∗∗ Signiﬁcant at the 5–percent
level. ∗∗∗ Signiﬁcant at the 1–percent level. OLS estimations yield similar results.
Table 8 conﬁrms to a large extent the intuition from Figure 1. In the two treatments
related to the Gale–Shapley mechanism, the protective strategies are played more often
the more risk averse the subjects are.29 All other strategies are, if anything, played less
often in these two treatments. With respect to the two treatments using the Boston
mechanism, we ﬁnd that risk aversion is uncorrelated with the use of the protective
strategies. Still, some of the other strategies are correlated to the switching point. In
particular, the ranking (1,3,2) is submitted less often by the highly risk averse (both in
BOSu and BOSc), while the strategy (2,1,3) is played more often in BOSc by them.
Result 4 (Risk aversion: protective behavior.) Subjects who are more risk averse
are more likely to play a protective strategy under the Gale–Shapley but not under the
Boston mechanism.
28Table 12 in Appendix B contains the results of Probit Maximum Likelihood estimations on the
decision of whether or not to submit a particular ranking for a given payoﬀ constellation. In these
estimations, we took into account the sequential play of the three matching markets by controlling for
earlier decisions. For example, in the estimations related to truth–telling in the situation GSu27, we
added whether the subject told the truth in GSu20 and GSu13 as additional explanatory variables. These
estimations conﬁrm the intuition provided by the Tobit estimations.
29It is interesting to see that in GSu, the highly risk averse are more likely to tell the truth and less
likely to report the ranking (3,×,×). One possible explanation for this is that risk aversion is correlated
with regret, which is minimized by being honest about one’s own preferences.
21Finally, we ask whether subjects with diﬀerent degrees of risk aversion react diﬀerently
to changes in cardinal preferences. We investigate this by dividing the subject pool of
each treatment into two groups according to when the subjects switch from lottery A to
lottery B in the paired lottery choice phase. The ﬁrst group, which we will label as the
“high risk aversion” subjects, consists of the individuals who switched in or later than the
seventh decision situation. The other individuals switched in or before the sixth decision
situation and are labeled as the “low risk aversion” subjects.30
Mechanism Rankings
(1,2,3) (1,3,2) (2,1,3) (2,3,1) (3,×,×)
Gale–Shapley unconstrained
20 ECU 0.5200 0.0000 0.4400 0.0000 0.0400
0.5652 0.0000 0.3478 0.0000 0.0870
13 ECU 0.8000 0.0000 0.2000 0.0000 0.0000
0.5652 0.0435 0.1739 0.0000 0.2174
27 ECU 0.4800 0.0000 0.4800 0.0400 0.0000
0.4783 0.0000 0.3913 0.0435 0.0870
Gale–Shapley constrained
20 ECU 0.2381 0.1905 0.0952 0.3810 0.0952
0.2500 0.1786 0.1786 0.2857 0.1071
13 ECU 0.0952 0.4286 0.0952 0.2381 0.1429
0.2500 0.2500 0.1071 0.2500 0.1429
27 ECU 0.1905 0.1429 0.1905 0.4286 0.0476
0.2500 0.1071 0.3571 0.2500 0.0357
Boston unconstrained
20 ECU 0.3000 0.0333 0.4667 0.1667 0.0333
0.5000 0.0000 0.3500 0.1500 0.0000
13 ECU 0.7000 0.0000 0.1667 0.0333 0.1000
0.5500 0.1000 0.1500 0.1000 0.1000
27 ECU 0.3000 0.0000 0.6333 0.0333 0.0333
0.3500 0.0000 0.5000 0.0500 0.1000
Boston constrained
20 ECU 0.2308 0.1538 0.1538 0.3846 0.0770
0.3636 0.2273 0.0909 0.0909 0.2273
13 ECU 0.1923 0.2692 0.1154 0.1923 0.2308
0.1818 0.4091 0.1364 0.1364 0.1365
27 ECU 0.1154 0.0000 0.3846 0.4231 0.0769
0.1364 0.0909 0.2273 0.4545 0.0910
Table 9: Probability distribution of submitted rankings for the high and the low risk averse subjects. The probabilities
for the high risk averse subjects are always presented on top of the probabilities for the low risk averse subjects. The most
salient rankings for each group are highlighted in boldface.
30The common switching point has not been chosen arbitrarily. According to our data, the average
switching point is 6.47 in GSu, 5.98 in GSc, 6.70 in BOSu, and 6.55 in treatment BOSc so that the
diﬀerence in the group sizes is minimal if the seventh decision situation is taken as the dividing line.
As a consequence, the high risk aversion group consists of 25 subjects in treatment GSu, 21 subjects in
treatment GSc, 31 subjects in treatment BOSu, and 26 subjects in treatment BOSc. The respective
numbers for the group of low risk aversion subjects are 23, 28, 20, and 22.
22Table 9 presents the probability distributions for the two groups under consideration.
To analyze the relation between risk aversion and cardinal preferences, we now apply
Mann Whitney U tests. The corresponding data is presented in Table 10, which should
be read as follows. Consider for example the element in the ﬁrst row and the (2,1,3)
column, which equals 0.0661. This value can be obtained from Table 9 by calculating the
diﬀerence between how the subjects with the high risk aversion (0.4400−0.2000 = 0.2400)
and how the subjects with the low risk aversion (0.3478 − 0.1739 = 0.1739) change the
use of the strategy (2,1,3) when the payoﬀ of the second school is reduced from 20 to
13ECU: 0.2400 − 0.1739 = 0.0661 (i.e., the diﬀerence from the high risk aversion group
minus the diﬀerence from the low risk aversion group). Consequently, Table 10 indicates
by how much the high risk averse subjects adapt their behavior in comparison to the low
risk averse subjects as cardinal preferences vary.
Mechanism Rankings
(1,2,3) (1,3,2) (2,1,3) (2,3,1) (3,×,×)
20 ECU - 13 ECU
Gale–Shapley unconstrained -0.2800 0.0435 0.0661 0.0000 0.1705
Gale–Shapley constrained 0.1429 -0.1667 -0.0714 0.1071 -0.0119
Boston unconstrained -0.3500 0.1333 0.1000 0.0833 0.0333
Boston constrained -0.1434 0.0664 0.0839 0.2378 -0.2448
20 ECU - 27 ECU
Gale–Shapley unconstrained -0.0470 0.0000 0.0035 0.0035 0.0400
Gale–Shapley constrained 0.0476 0.0238 0.0833 -0.0833 0.0238
Boston unconstrained -0.1500 0.0333 -0.0167 0.0333 0.1000
Boston constrained -0.1119 0.0175 -0.0944 0.3252 -0.1364
Table 10: Diﬀerences in the probability changes between the group of individuals with a high degree of risk aversion and
the group of subjects with a low degree of risk aversion. (See the text for an interpretation of the numbers.) The shifts
that turned out signiﬁcant for the whole population are highlighted in boldface.
Three of the shifts in behavior that turned out signiﬁcant for the whole population are
primarily caused by diﬀerent attitudes towards risk. First, the subjects with the high risk
aversion tell the truth with probability 0.5200 in GSu20 and with probability 0.8000 in
GSu13. Consequently, a decrease in the monetary payoﬀ of school 2 causes these subjects
to increase the level of truth–telling by 28%. On the other hand, the subjects with the
low risk aversion tell the truth with probability 0.5652 in both GSu20 and GSu13. This
allows us to conclude that the high risk aversion subjects are responsible for the increase
in the level of truth–telling in treatment GSu as the payoﬀ of school 2 decreases from 20 to
13ECU (p = 0.0315). Second, it can be seen from Table 9 that the same eﬀect occurs in
BOSu. A decrease of the payoﬀ of the second school induces the subjects with a high risk
aversion to increase their level of truth–telling from 0.3000 to 0.7000, the corresponding
change for the subjects with a low risk aversion is 0.5500 − 0.5000 = 0.0500 (so that the
23diﬀerence–in–diﬀerence is 0.3500). Since this diﬀerence is signiﬁcant (p = 0.0373), it is
again the more risk averse subjects who are responsable for the overall eﬀect. Third, an
increase in the payoﬀ of the second school from 20 to 27ECU makes individuals play more
often the strategy (2,3,1) in BOSc. Looking back at Table 4, we indeed see that the use
of this strategy increases from 0.2545 to 0.4364. This result is caused by the subjects
with a low risk aversion as they increase the use of that particular strategy by about 36%
from only 0.0909 to 0.4545. The crucial point is that the high risk aversion subjects are
not so responsive to that change in cardinal preferences because the strategy (2,3,1) is
already the most played one when the payoﬀ of the second school is 20ECU. Indeed, this
subgroup plays the strategy (2,3,1) with probability 0.3846 before and with probability
0.4231 after the change of payoﬀs. The diﬀerence between the two subgroups is signiﬁcant
at p = 0.0298.31
Clearly, these diﬀerences in behavior have noteworthy consequences in terms of eﬃ-
ciency, which is reﬂected in Table 11. The behavior of the highly risk averse subjects
is mostly responsible for the ranking of the two mechanisms. In fact, higher levels of
truth–telling under GSu by the highly risk averse for every payoﬀ constellation explain
the eﬃciency advantage of GSu over BOSu. Imposing a limited length on submittable
rankings decreases eﬃciency within both subgroups. Moreover, since under GSu eﬃ-
ciency generally attains higher levels among the highly risk averse than among the low
risk averse, while the opposite happens under GSc, the negative impact of the constraint
is particularly important within the group of the highly risk averse.
Mechanism Eﬃciency Stability
20ECU 13ECU 27ECU 20ECU 13ECU 27ECU
Gale–Shapley unconstrained 21.3594 21.7040 27.3318 0.8894 1.0000 1.0000
21.5916 18.3070 25.8293 0.7824 0.5922 0.7931
Gale–Shapley constrained 17.2544 15.6880 21.9560 0.6016 0.4850 0.6814
17.7253 15.1851 23.9789 0.5414 0.4938 0.6918
Boston unconstrained 20.2667 21.1994 25.7298 0.7027 0.4700 0.7274
21.2500 20.0134 24.5106 0.6250 0.4641 0.5601
Boston constrained 17.9555 14.7508 24.5485 0.4374 0.3039 0.7623
18.6199 17.2503 22.3288 0.3235 0.3230 0.5445
Table 11: Actual eﬃciency (to the left) and probability of stable matchings (to the right) for the high and the low risk
aversion subjects for every possible payoﬀ of school 2. The values for the high risk aversion subjects are always presented
on top of the values for the low risk aversion subjects.
31In some instances, a change in cardinal preferences did not induce an overall eﬀect in behavior but,
nevertheless, the diﬀerence between the two subgroups is signiﬁcant as they respond in a diﬀerent direction
to the change in payoﬀs. Decreasing the payoﬀ from 20 to 13ECU leads to a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
the two subgroups for strategy (1,3,2) in BOSu (p = 0.0292), for strategy (2,3,1) in BOSc (p = 0.0338),
and for strategy (3,×,×) in GSu (p = 0.0204) and BOSc (p = 0.0251). Similarly, increasing the payoﬀ
from 20 to 27ECU leads to a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two subgroups for strategy (2,3,1) in
BOSu (p = 0.0377).
24Some remarks on how stability is aﬀected by the degree of risk aversion are due.
The relevant numbers are also presented in Table 11. In general, the diﬀerences in the
percentage of stable matchings obtained within each group of subjects follow roughly the
same rules as those obtained when the full sample is considered. Two points are worth
noticing, though. First, the levels of stability under the unconstrained mechanisms are
higher among the highly risk averse subjects, reaching 100% under GSu when the second
school is worth 13 and 27ECU. Second, as previously noted for eﬃciency, the constraint
reduces stability and this impact under the Gale–Shapley mechanism is more substantial
within the highly risk averse.
Result 5 (Risk aversion: eﬃciency and stability.) For both subgroups and under
almost all payoﬀ conﬁgurations, GSu outperforms BOSu and BOSc outperforms GSc in
eﬃciency terms. Moreover, the negative impact of constraining the length of submittable
rankings on eﬃciency and stability under the Gale–Shapley mechanism is stronger for the
highly risk averse.
7 Concluding Discussion
In this paper, we have studied how cardinal preferences, i.e., relative preference intensities,
and risk aversion aﬀect individual behavior in a stylized experimental matching market.
The clearest lesson is perhaps that cardinality is important in that it may shape individual
behavior and, in turn, aﬀect both eﬃciency and stability of the mechanisms.
A second contribution of the present study to the ongoing debate on Gale–Shapley vs.
Boston is related to risk aversion. It is widely accepted that individual participants in a
market try to manage risk in ways that aﬀect the market as a whole. Matching markets
are no exception. One reason for this lies in the fact that the Gale–Shapley mechanism
fosters the use of “safe” strategies by the highly risk averse. In fact, we observe that
there is a clear tendency for highly risk averse agents to resort to protective strategies
under this mechanism. Also, risk aversion is important when it comes to the evaluation of
the constraint on submittable rankings. Calsamiglia et al. [9] showed that introducing a
constraint is detrimental to the performance of the mechanisms. Our results suggest that,
under the Gale–Shapley mechanism, this negative impact especially aﬀects the highly risk
averse.
All this serves as a word of caution for experimentalists (when considering new designs)
and theorists (when constructing new models) both alike, but perhaps more importantly,
it should be taken into account by market designers as our results unveil additional di-
mensions in which the Gale–Shapley and Boston mechanisms can be compared. The
Gale–Shapley mechanism is more eﬃcient and more stable than the Boston mechanism
in the unconstrained setting, almost independently of the subject pool and the preference
25intensities.32 One could conclude from this that the Gale–Shapley mechanism is to be
preferred for “small” markets where it is both allowed and no burden for the participants
to submit complete full rankings. Our message is diﬀerent if the market is “large,” in the
sense that it is unfeasible for the participants to rank all schools, and a constrained mech-
anism has to be implemented almost necessarily. Now, the Boston mechanism performs
better in terms of eﬃciency not only for the whole subject pool (for all preference inten-
sities) but also within the more homogeneous subgroups (for most preference intensities).
The Gale–Shapley mechanism is still more stable and, therefore, the ultimate decision of
which mechanism to choose in the constrained setting would depend on whether eﬃciency
or stability is considered more desirable.
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27Appendix A: Instructions (Translated from Spanish)1
Welcome
Dear participant, thank you for taking part in this experiment. It will last at most 90 minutes. If you
read the following instructions carefully, you can – depending on your decisions – earn some more money
in addition to the 3 Euro show-up fee, which you can keep in any case. In order to ensure that the
experiment takes place in an optimal setting, we would like to ask you to abide to the following rules
during the whole experiment:
• do not communicate with your fellow students!
• do not forget to switch oﬀ your mobile phone!
• read the instructions carefully. If something is not well explained or you have any question now or
at any time during the experiment, then ask one of the experimenters. Do, however, not ask out
loud, raise your hand instead. We will clarify questions privately.
• you may take notes on this instruction sheet if you wish.
• after the experiment, remain seated till we paid you oﬀ.
If you do not obey the rules, the data becomes useless for us. In that case, we will have to exclude you
from this experiment and you will not receive any compensation. Also, note that all participants receive
the same instructions.
The Experiment
This experiment consists of two phases. Now, we will only introduce the ﬁrst phase. Once it has ﬁnished,
we are going to explain the second phase. However, always remember the following very important points:
1. The two phases take place in a completely anonymous setting. So, you will neither know nor learn
whom you are playing with.
2. You will only be paid for phase 1 or phase 2, but not for the combined results. At the end of
the whole experiment, the participant playing at terminal 9 will determine which phase is payoﬀ
relevant by throwing a coin.
3. You will not receive any feedback about your decision or the decision of your co-players until the
very end of the experiment.
4. We will not speak of Euro during the experiment, but rather of ECU (experimental currency units).
Your whole income will ﬁrst be calculated in ECU. At the end of the experiment, the total amount
you have earned will be converted to Euro. We will always indicate the exchange rate between ECU
and Euro.
The First Phase
First we introduce you to the basic decision situation. Then, you will learn how the experiment is
conducted. Note that if phase 1 is randomly selected for payment, then you will receive 4 Euro for every
ECU earned during this phase.
1We ﬁrst provide the full instructions for GSu. After that, we only provide the instructions for the “Second Phase” of
the other three treatments, since the rest of the instructions are exactly as in GSu.
28The First Decision Environment
In the ﬁrst phase of the experiment, your basic task is to choose several times between two lottery
tickets that are denoted Option A and Option B, respectively. In particular, lottery ticket A gives you a
monetary payoﬀ of xA ECU with probability px(A) and a monetary payoﬀ of yA ECU with the remaining
probability py(A) = 1−px(A). Similarly, lottery ticket B gives a you a monetary payoﬀ of xB ECU with
probability px(B) and a monetary payoﬀ of yB ECU with probability py(B) = 1 − py(B). As a simple
example consider the lottery ticket A which is such that you get 5 ECU in 3 out of 10 cases and 10 ECU
in 7 out of ten cases. Then, xA = 5.00 ECU, px(A) = 0.3, yA = 10.00 ECU and py(A) = 0.7.
The First Experiment
The ﬁrst phase includes the basic decision environment just described to you. In total, there are ten pairs
of lottery tickets; so, you have to make ten choices. In all ten situations, monetary payoﬀs are such that
xA = 2.00 ECU, xB = 3.85 ECU, yA = 1.60 ECU, and yB = 0.10 ECU. However, the probabilities with
which you are going to get each prize change across situations. The following ﬁgure shows the computer
screen you are going to encounter during the experiment.
The computer screen presents all ten situations simultaneously with the lottery ticket A to the left of
lottery ticket B. For example, in situation number 4 lottery ticket A gives you 2.00 ECU in 4 out of 10
cases and 1.60 ECU in 6 out of 10 cases. You choose between the lottery tickets by clicking the desired
option on the right hand side of the screen. Once you have made all ten choices, click on the button
“Continue”.
If it happens that phase 1 is randomly selected for payment, one of the ten pairs of lotteries is randomly
selected by the computer (each pair is selected with the same probability). Given this random draw, your
payoﬀ is then determined by using the lottery you have chosen in that particular situation. For example,
if situation 9 is randomly selected and you have chosen option A in that case, then you get 2 ECU with
probability 0.9 and 1.6 ECU with probability 0.1. Finally, please answer the question below. Once ready,
please raise your hand.
QUESTION: Suppose lottery ticket A is such that it gives you 3 ECU with probability 0.7 and 1 ECU
with probability 0.3. Similarly, lottery ticket B gives you 3 ECU with probability 0.7 and 2 ECU with
probability 0.3. Which option do you choose?
29The Second Phase (GSu)
First we introduce you to the basic decision situation. Next, you will ﬁnd control questions that help you
to understand the situation better. Finally, you will learn how the experiment is conducted. Note that
if phase 2 is randomly selected for payment, then you will receive 40 Eurocents for every ECU earned
during this phase.
The Second Decision Environment
The basic decision environment in the second phase of the experiment is as follows: There are three
teachers —let us call them teacher 1, teacher 2, and teacher 3— who are looking for a new job. There
are three schools in town (denoted X, Y , and Z) and every school happens to have one open teaching
slot. Since the schools turn out to diﬀer in their location and quality, teachers have diﬀerent opinions of
where they want to teach. The desirability of schools in terms of location and quality is expressed in the
following table:
Teacher 1 Teacher 2 Teacher 3
Most preferred school X Y Z
Second most preferred school Y Z X
Least preferred school Z X Y
For example, teacher 1 prefers school X to school Y and school Y to school Z. Schools when oﬀering
positions consider the quality of each applicant and the experience they have. On this basis, they build
a priority ordering where all teachers are ranked. The following table summarizes the priority ordering
of each school.
School X School Y School Z
Best candidate 2 3 1
Second best candidate 3 1 2
Worst candidate 1 2 3
For example, in school Z, teacher 1 is ranked ﬁrst, teacher 2 is ranked second, and teacher 3 is ranked
third. To decide which teacher gets oﬀered a position at which school, teachers are ﬁrst asked to submit
their ranking of schools; that is, they have to indicate at which school they would like to work most, at
which school they would like to work second most, and at which school they would like to work least.
Observe that teachers can indicate whatever ranking they like, it does not have to coincide with the
actual preferences. Given the submitted rankings, the following procedure is used to assign teachers to
schools:
1. Every teacher applies to the school she/he listed ﬁrst.
2. Each school temporarily accepts the applicant with the highest priority and rejects all other appli-
cants (if any).
3. Whenever a teacher is rejected at a school, she/he applies to the next highest listed school.
4. Whenever a school receives new applications (from teachers that have been rejected in a previous
round by other schools), these applications are considered together with the previously retained
application (if any). Among the previously retained application and new applications, the applicant
with the highest priority is temporarily accepted, all others are rejected.
5. This process is repeated until no more applications can be rejected and the allocation is ﬁnalized.
Each teacher is assigned the position at the school that holds her/his application at the end of the
process.
30Example
Before we explain how the experiment is conducted, we would like to ask you to go over the following ex-
ample. It helps illustrating how the allocation mechanism works. Once ready, please raise your hand, and
one of the experimenters will check your answers. In case of questions, please contact any experimenter
as well.
In the example, there are three teachers (1, 2, and 3) and three schools (A, B, and C) who have one
teaching position each. Suppose that the submitted school rankings are as follows:
Teacher 1 Teacher 2 Teacher 3
1st ranked school B C B
2nd ranked school C A C
3rd ranked school A B A
Also, suppose that the priority orderings of the schools are given by the following table:
School A School B School C
1st ranked teacher 2 2 1
2nd ranked teacher 3 1 3
3rd ranked teacher 1 3 2
Please, answer the following questions:
1. In the ﬁrst round of the procedure, every teacher applies to the school she/he ranked ﬁrst; that is,
teacher 1 applies to school , teacher 2 applies to school , and teacher 3 applies to
school . Given these applications, every school temporarily accepts the applicant with the
highest priority and rejects all other teachers. Hence, school B retains teacher and rejects
teacher , while school C retains teacher .
2. In the second round, all teachers rejected in the ﬁrst round apply to the school they ranked second;
that is, teacher 3 applies to school . Now, schools compare the new applicants with the
previously retained teachers. As a consequence, school C retains teacher and rejects teacher
.
3. In the third round, the teacher that got rejected in the second round applies to the next highest
ranked school. Hence, teacher applies to school . Since this school has still a free
place all teachers are assigned to a school and the mechanism stops.
4. The ﬁnal allocation of teachers to school is therefore as follows:
• Teacher gets a job at A.
• Teacher gets a job at B.
• Teacher gets a job at C.
The Second Experiment
In the beginning of the second phase, the computer randomly divides the participants into groups of 3.
The assignment process is random and anonymous, so no participant will know who is in which group.
Participants within the same group will only play among themselves. Then, each participant in a group
gets randomly assigned the role of a teacher in such a way that one group member will be in the role of
teacher 1, another group member will be in the role of teacher 2, and the ﬁnal group member will be in
the role of teacher 3. Neither the division of participants into groups nor the assignment of roles within
groups is going to change during the second phase.
The basic decision situation explained above will be played three times with varying payoﬀs. In what
follows, we will only explain the ﬁrst payoﬀ constellation in detail, the remaining two situations have
31a similar structure. In particular, the ﬁrst payoﬀ constellation is such that you receive 30 ECU if you
end up at the school you prefer most, 20 ECU if you are assigned to your second most preferred
school, and 10 ECU if you get a job at the school you prefer least. To clarify how the experiment
proceeds, we will present next the computer screen you are going to encounter during the experiment.
On the top of the screen, we remind you of the preferences of the teachers over schools together with
the material consequences and the priorities of schools over teachers. Below you see that you are assigned
the role of teacher 1. Consequently, your payoﬀ is highest if you end up working at school X, it second
highest if you work at school Y , and it is lowest if you ﬁnally get a job at school Z.
At the bottom of the screen, you are asked to submit a ranking of schools. Remember that you are
allowed to submit any ranking you want. On the left hand side you indicate the school that you rank
ﬁrst, in the middle you indicate the school you rank second, and to the right hand side you indicate the
school you rank last. The submitted rankings are then used by the computer to determine (by means of
the procedure presented before) the ﬁnal assignment of teachers to schools.
Finally, observe that if the second phase is randomly chosen to be payoﬀ relevant, then the computer
is going to determine randomly one of the three situations for payment (every situation is randomly
selected with the same probability). Also, note that you will never receive any feedback about decisions
until the very end of the experiment. Please answer the following ﬁnal question. Once ready, please raise
your hand.
QUESTION: Suppose that you prefer school X over school Z over school Y . Assume also that you submit
the following ranking of schools: X is listed higher than Y , which, in turn, is listed higher than Z. Using
the same payoﬀs in ECU as in the example on the computer screen above, what will be your ﬁnal payoﬀ
if you ﬁnally end up working at school Y ?
ANSWER: ECU.
32The Second Phase (GSc)
First we introduce you to the basic decision situation. Next, you will ﬁnd control questions that help you
to understand the situation better. Finally, you will learn how the experiment is conducted. Note that
if phase 2 is randomly selected for payment, then you will receive 40 Eurocents for every ECU earned
during this phase.
The Second Decision Environment
The basic decision environment in the second phase of the experiment is as follows: There are three
teachers —let us call them teacher 1, teacher 2, and teacher 3— who are looking for a new job. There
are three schools in town (denoted X, Y , and Z) and every school happens to have one open teaching
slot. Since the schools turn out to diﬀer in their location and quality, teachers have diﬀerent opinions of
where they want to teach. The desirability of schools in terms of location and quality is expressed in the
following table:
Teacher 1 Teacher 2 Teacher 3
Most preferred school X Y Z
Second most preferred school Y Z X
Least preferred school Z X Y
For example, teacher 1 prefers school X to school Y and school Y to school Z. Schools when oﬀering
positions consider the quality of each applicant and the experience they have. On this basis, they build
a priority ordering where all teachers are ranked. The following table summarizes the priority ordering
of each school.
School X School Y School Z
Best candidate 2 3 1
Second best candidate 3 1 2
Worst candidate 1 2 3
For example, in school Z, teacher 1 is ranked ﬁrst, teacher 2 is ranked second, and teacher 3 is ranked
third. To decide which teacher gets oﬀered a position at which school, teachers are ﬁrst asked to submit
their ranking of schools; that is, they have to indicate at which school they would like to work most
and at which school they would like to work second most. Observe that teachers can indicate whatever
ranking they like, it does not have to coincide with the actual preferences. Given the submitted rankings,
the following procedure is used to assign teachers to schools:
1. Every teacher applies to the school she/he listed ﬁrst.
2. Each school temporarily accepts the applicant with the highest priority and rejects all other appli-
cants (if any).
3. Whenever a teacher is rejected at a school, she/he applies to the next highest listed school.
4. Whenever a school receives new applications (from teachers that have been rejected in a previous
round by other schools), these applications are considered together with the previously retained
application (if any). Among the previously retained application and new applications, the applicant
with the highest priority is accepted, all others are rejected.
5. This process ﬁnishes when no more applications can be rejected or no teacher can send more
applications. Each teacher is assigned the position at the school that holds her/his application at
the end of the process. If a teacher’s application was rejected by every school in her/his ranking,
she/he will be unemployed.
33Example
Before we explain how the experiment is conducted, we would like to ask you to go over the following ex-
ample. It helps illustrating how the allocation mechanism works. Once ready, please raise your hand, and
one of the experimenters will check your answers. In case of questions, please contact any experimenter
as well.
In the example, there are three teachers (1, 2, and 3) and three schools (A, B, and C) who have one
teaching position each. Suppose that the submitted school rankings are as follows:
Teacher 1 Teacher 2 Teacher 3
1st ranked school B C B
2nd ranked school C A C
Also, suppose that the priority orderings of the schools are given by the following table:
School A School B School C
1st ranked teacher 2 2 1
2nd ranked teacher 3 1 3
3rd ranked teacher 1 3 2
Please, answer the following questions:
1. In the ﬁrst round of the procedure, every teacher applies to the school she/he ranked ﬁrst; that is,
teacher 1 applies to school , teacher 2 applies to school , and teacher 3 applies to
school . Given these applications, every school temporarily accepts the applicant with the
highest priority and rejects all other teachers. Hence, school B retains teacher and rejects
teacher , while school C retains teacher .
2. In the second round, all teachers rejected in the ﬁrst round apply to the school they ranked second;
that is, teacher 3 applies to school . Now, schools compare the new applicants with the
previously retained teachers. As a consequence, school C retains teacher and rejects teacher
.
3. In the third round, the teacher that got rejected in the second round applies to the next highest
ranked school. Hence, teacher applies to school . Since this school has still a free
place all teachers are assigned to a school and the mechanism stops.
4. The ﬁnal allocation of teachers to school is therefore as follows:
• Teacher gets a job at A.
• Teacher gets a job at B.
• Teacher gets a job at C.
The Second Experiment
In the beginning of the second phase, the computer randomly divides the participants into groups of 3.
The assignment process is random and anonymous, so no participant will know who is in which group.
Participants within the same group will only play among themselves. Then, each participant in a group
gets randomly assigned the role of a teacher in such a way that one group member will be in the role of
teacher 1, another group member will be in the role of teacher 2, and the ﬁnal group member will be in
the role of teacher 3. Neither the division of participants into groups nor the assignment of roles within
groups is going to change during the second phase.
The basic decision situation explained above will be played three times with varying payoﬀs. In what
follows, we will only explain the ﬁrst payoﬀ constellation in detail, the remaining two situations have
a similar structure. In particular, the ﬁrst payoﬀ constellation is such that you receive 30 ECU if you
34end up at the school you prefer most, 20 ECU if you are assigned to your second most preferred
school, and 10 ECU if you get a job at the school you prefer least. If you end up unassigned because
all of your applications have been rejected, you receive 0 ECU. To clarify how the experiment proceeds,
we will present next the computer screen you are going to encounter during the experiment.
On the top of the screen, we remind you of the preferences of the teachers over schools together with
the material consequences and the priorities of schools over teachers. Below you see that you are assigned
the role of teacher 1. Consequently, your payoﬀ is highest if you end up working at school X, it second
highest if you work at school Y , and it is lowest if you ﬁnally get a job at school Z. Remember that you
will receive 0 ECU in case all of your applications are rejected.
At the bottom of the screen, you are asked to submit a ranking of schools. Remember that you are
allowed to submit any ranking you want. On the left hand side you indicate the school that you rank ﬁrst
and on the right hand side you indicate the school you rank second. The submitted rankings are then
used by the computer to determine (by means of the procedure presented before) the ﬁnal assignment
of teachers to schools. Also, note that you will never receive any feedback about decisions until the very
end of the experiment.
Finally, observe that if the second phase is randomly chosen to be payoﬀ relevant, then the computer
is going to determine randomly one of the three situations for payment (every situation is randomly
selected with the same probability). Please answer the following ﬁnal question. Once ready, please raise
your hand.
QUESTION: Suppose that you prefer school X over school Z over school Y . Assume also that you submit
the following ranking of schools: X is ranked ﬁrst and school Y is ranked second. Using the same payoﬀs
in ECU as in the example on the computer screen above, what will be your ﬁnal payoﬀ if you ﬁnally end
up working at school Y ?
ANSWER: ECU.
35The Second Phase (BOSu)
First we introduce you to the basic decision situation. Next, you will ﬁnd control questions that help you
to understand the situation better. Finally, you will learn how the experiment is conducted. Note that
if phase 2 is randomly selected for payment, then you will receive 40 Eurocents for every ECU earned
during this phase.
The Second Decision Environment
The basic decision environment in the second phase of the experiment is as follows: There are three
teachers —let us call them teacher 1, teacher 2, and teacher 3— who are looking for a new job. There
are three schools in town (denoted X, Y , and Z) and every school happens to have one open teaching
slot. Since the schools turn out to diﬀer in their location and quality, teachers have diﬀerent opinions of
where they want to teach. The desirability of schools in terms of location and quality is expressed in the
following table:
Teacher 1 Teacher 2 Teacher 3
Most preferred school X Y Z
Second most preferred school Y Z X
Least preferred school Z X Y
For example, teacher 1 prefers school X to school Y and school Y to school Z. Schools when oﬀering
positions consider the quality of each applicant and the experience they have. On this basis, they build
a priority ordering where all teachers are ranked. The following table summarizes the priority ordering
of each school.
School X School Y School Z
Best candidate 2 3 1
Second best candidate 3 1 2
Worst candidate 1 2 3
For example, in school Z, teacher 1 is ranked ﬁrst, teacher 2 is ranked second, and teacher 3 is ranked
third. To decide which teacher gets oﬀered a position at which school, teachers are ﬁrst asked to submit
their ranking of schools; that is, they have to indicate at which school they would like to work most, at
which school they would like to work second most, and at which school they would like to work least.
Observe that teachers can indicate whatever ranking they like, it does not have to coincide with the
actual preferences. Given the submitted rankings, the following procedure is used to assign teachers to
schools:
Step 1
1. Every teacher applies to the school she/he listed ﬁrst.
2. Each school accepts the applicant with the highest priority and rejects all other applicants (if any).
Step 2
1. Whenever a teacher is rejected at a school, an application is sent to the second listed school.
2. A school that received one or more applications in step 1 rejects the applications received in step
2 (if any). A school that did not receive any applications in step 1 accepts the applicant with the
highest priority and rejects the other application received (if any).
Step 3
1. If a teacher’s application is rejected in step 2, she/he is assigned to the school she/he listed third.
The other teachers are assigned to the schools that accepted their applications.
362. If no teacher’s application was rejected in step 2, each teacher is assigned to the school that accepted
her/his application.
Example
Before we explain how the experiment is conducted, we would like to ask you to go over the following ex-
ample. It helps illustrating how the allocation mechanism works. Once ready, please raise your hand, and
one of the experimenters will check your answers. In case of questions, please contact any experimenter
as well.
In the example, there are three teachers (1,2, and 3) and three schools (A, B, and C) who have one
teaching position each. Suppose that the submitted school rankings are as follows:
Teacher 1 Teacher 2 Teacher 3
1st ranked school B C B
2nd ranked school C A C
3rd ranked school A B A
Also, suppose that the priority orderings of the schools are given by the following table:
School A School B School C
1st ranked teacher 2 2 1
2nd ranked teacher 3 1 3
3rd ranked teacher 1 3 2
Please, answer the following questions:
Step 1
1. In the ﬁrst round of the procedure, every teacher applies to the school she/he ranked ﬁrst; that is,
teacher 1 applies to school , teacher 2 applies to school , and teacher 3 applies to
school .
2. Given these applications, every school accepts the applicant with the highest priority and rejects
all other teachers. Hence, school B accepts teacher and rejects teacher , while school
C accepts teacher .
Step 2
1. In the second round, all teachers rejected in the ﬁrst round apply to the school they ranked second;
that is, teacher 3 applies to school .
2. Each school that received an application in step 2 rejects the applications received in step 2 (if any).
As a consequence, school rejects teacher .
Step 3
In the third round, the teacher that got rejected in the second round is assigned to his third ranked school.
Hence, teacher is assigned to school . The other teachers are assigned to the schools that
accepted their applications. The ﬁnal allocation of teachers to school is therefore as follows: teacher
gets a job at A; teacher gets a job at B; and teacher gets a job at C.
The Second Experiment
In the beginning of the second phase, the computer randomly divides the participants into groups of 3.
The assignment process is random and anonymous, so no participant will know who is in which group.
Participants within the same group will only play among themselves. Then, each participant in a group
gets randomly assigned the role of a teacher in such a way that one group member will be in the role of
teacher 1, another group member will be in the role of teacher 2, and the ﬁnal group member will be in
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groups is going to change during the second phase.
The basic decision situation explained above will be played three times with varying payoﬀs. In what
follows, we will only explain the ﬁrst payoﬀ constellation in detail, the remaining two situations have
a similar structure. In particular, the ﬁrst payoﬀ constellation is such that you receive 30 ECU if you
end up at the school you prefer most, 20 ECU if you are assigned to your second most preferred
school, and 10 ECU if you get a job at the school you prefer least. To clarify how the experiment
proceeds, we will present next the computer screen you are going to encounter during the experiment.
On the top of the screen, we remind you of the preferences of the teachers over schools together with
the material consequences and the priorities of schools over teachers. Below you see that you are assigned
the role of teacher 1. Consequently, your payoﬀ is highest if you end up working at school X, it second
highest if you work at school Y , and it is lowest if you ﬁnally get a job at school Z.
At the bottom of the screen, you are asked to submit a ranking of schools. Remember that you are
allowed to submit any ranking you want. On the left hand side you indicate the school that you rank
ﬁrst, in the middle you indicate the school you rank second, and to the right hand side you indicate the
school you rank last. The submitted rankings are then used by the computer to determine (by means of
the procedure presented before) the ﬁnal assignment of teachers to schools.
Finally, observe that if the second phase is randomly chosen to be payoﬀ relevant, then the computer
is going to determine randomly one of the three situations for payment (every situation is randomly
selected with the same probability). Also, note that you will never receive any feedback about decisions
until the very end of the experiment. Please answer the following ﬁnal question. Once ready, please raise
your hand.
QUESTION: Suppose that you prefer school X over school Z over school Y . Assume also that you submit
the following ranking of schools: X is listed ﬁrst, Y is listed second, and Z is listed third. Using the
same payoﬀs in ECU as in the example on the computer screen above, what will be your ﬁnal payoﬀ if
you ﬁnally end up working at school Y ?
ANSWER: ECU.
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First we introduce you to the basic decision situation. Next, you will ﬁnd control questions that help you
to understand the situation better. Finally, you will learn how the experiment is conducted. Note that
if phase 2 is randomly selected for payment, then you will receive 40 Eurocents for every ECU earned
during this phase.
The Second Decision Environment
The basic decision environment in the second phase of the experiment is as follows: There are three
teachers —let us call them teacher 1, teacher 2, and teacher 3— who are looking for a new job. There
are three schools in town (denoted X, Y , and Z) and every school happens to have one open teaching
slot. Since the schools turn out to diﬀer in their location and quality, teachers have diﬀerent opinions of
where they want to teach. The desirability of schools in terms of location and quality is expressed in the
following table:
Teacher 1 Teacher 2 Teacher 3
Most preferred school X Y Z
Second most preferred school Y Z X
Least preferred school Z X Y
For example, teacher 1 prefers school X to school Y and school Y to school Z. Schools when oﬀering
positions consider the quality of each applicant and the experience they have. On this basis, they build
a priority ordering where all teachers are ranked. The following table summarizes the priority ordering
of each school.
School X School Y School Z
Best candidate 2 3 1
Second best candidate 3 1 2
Worst candidate 1 2 3
For example, in school Z, teacher 1 is ranked ﬁrst, teacher 2 is ranked second, and teacher 3 is ranked
third. To decide which teacher gets oﬀered a position at which school, teachers are ﬁrst asked to submit
their ranking of schools; that is, they have to indicate at which school they would like to work most
and at which school they would like to work second most. Observe that teachers can indicate whatever
ranking they like, it does not have to coincide with the actual preferences. Given the submitted rankings,
the following procedure is used to assign teachers to schools:
Step 1
1. Every teacher applies to the school she/he listed ﬁrst.
2. Each school accepts the applicant with the highest priority and rejects all other applicants (if any).
Step 2
1. Whenever a teacher is rejected at a school, an application is sent to the second listed school.
2. A school that received one or more applications in step 1 rejects the applications received in step
2 (if any). A school that did not receive any applications in step 1 accepts the applicant with the
highest priority and rejects the other application received (if any).
Step 3
1. If a teacher’s application is rejected in step 2, she/he is left unassigned. The other teachers are
assigned to the schools that accepted their applications.
2. If no teacher’s application was rejected in step 2, each teacher is assigned to the school that accepted
her/his application.
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Before we explain how the experiment is conducted, we would like to ask you to go over the following ex-
ample. It helps illustrating how the allocation mechanism works. Once ready, please raise your hand, and
one of the experimenters will check your answers. In case of questions, please contact any experimenter
as well.
In the example, there are three teachers (1,2, and 3) and three schools (A, B, and C) who have one
teaching position each. Suppose that the submitted school rankings are as follows:
Teacher 1 Teacher 2 Teacher 3
1st ranked school B C B
2nd ranked school C A A
Also, suppose that the priority orderings of the schools are given by the following table:
School A School B School C
1st ranked teacher 2 2 1
2nd ranked teacher 3 1 3
3rd ranked teacher 1 3 2
Please, answer the following questions:
Step 1
1. In the ﬁrst round of the procedure, every teacher applies to the school she/he ranked ﬁrst; that is,
teacher 1 applies to school , teacher 2 applies to school , and teacher 3 applies to
school .
2. Given these applications, every school accepts the applicant with the highest priority and rejects
all other teachers. Hence, school B accepts teacher and rejects teacher , while school
C accepts teacher .
Step 2
1. In the second round, all teachers rejected in the ﬁrst round apply to the school they ranked second;
that is, teacher 3 applies to school .
2. Each school that received an application in step 2 rejects the applications received in step 2 (if
any). School did not receive any applications in step 1, but receives the application of
teacher in step 2. Since this is the only application it receives, it accepts the application.
Step 3
Since no teacher was rejected in step 2, each teacher is assigned to the school that accepted her/his
application. The ﬁnal allocation of teachers to school is therefore as follows: teacher gets a job at
A; teacher gets a job at B; and teacher gets a job at C.
The Second Experiment
In the beginning of the second phase, the computer randomly divides the participants into groups of 3.
The assignment process is random and anonymous, so no participant will know who is in which group.
Participants within the same group will only play among themselves. Then, each participant in a group
gets randomly assigned the role of a teacher in such a way that one group member will be in the role of
teacher 1, another group member will be in the role of teacher 2, and the ﬁnal group member will be in
the role of teacher 3. Neither the division of participants into groups nor the assignment of roles within
groups is going to change during the second phase.
The basic decision situation explained above will be played three times with varying payoﬀs. In what
follows, we will only explain the ﬁrst payoﬀ constellation in detail, the remaining two situations have
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end up at the school you prefer most, 20 ECU if you are assigned to your second most preferred
school, and 10 ECU if you get a job at the school you prefer least. If you are unassigned because
all of your applications got rejected, you receive 0 ECU. To clarify how the experiment proceeds, we will
present next the computer screen you are going to encounter during the experiment.
On the top of the screen, we remind you of the preferences of the teachers over schools together with
the material consequences and the priorities of schools over teachers. Below you see that you are assigned
the role of teacher 1. Consequently, your payoﬀ is highest if you end up working at school X, it second
highest if you work at school Y , and it is lowest if you ﬁnally get a job at school Z. Remember that you
get 0 ECU in case all of your applications get rejected.
At the bottom of the screen, you are asked to submit a ranking of schools. Remember that you are
allowed to submit any ranking you want. On the left hand side you indicate the school that you rank ﬁrst
and to the right hand side you indicate the school you rank second. The submitted rankings are then
used by the computer to determine (by means of the procedure presented before) the ﬁnal assignment of
teachers to schools.
Finally, observe that if the second phase is randomly chosen to be payoﬀ relevant, then the computer
is going to determine randomly one of the three situations for payment (every situation is randomly
selected with the same probability). Also, note that you will never receive any feedback about decisions
until the very end of the experiment. Please answer the following ﬁnal question. Once ready, please raise
your hand.
QUESTION: Suppose that you prefer school X over school Z over school Y . Assume also that you
submit the following ranking of schools: X is listed ﬁrst and Y is listed second. Using the same payoﬀs
in ECU as in the example on the computer screen above, what will be your ﬁnal payoﬀ if you ﬁnally end
up working at school Y ?
ANSWER: ECU.
41Appendix B: Probit ML Estimation Results
Treatment Rankings
(1,2,3) (1,3,2) (2,1,3) (2,3,1) (3,×,×)
GSu20 0.0795 0.0163 −0.2194
(0.1019) (0.1011) (0.2246)
GSu13 0.3165∗∗∗ −0.2165∗∗∗ 0.0187 −0.6115∗∗∗
(0.1209) (0.0930) (0.1069) (0.2254)
GSu27 0.0779 −0.0984 −0.0687 −0.0639
(0.1110) (0.1130) (0.1938) (0.1400)
GSc20 0.0043 0.0742 −0.2545∗∗ 0.2192∗∗ −0.1392
(0.0949) (0.0874) (0.1186) (0.1000) (0.1209)
GSc13 −0.2545∗∗∗ 0.1359∗ −0.0187 0.0295 0.0833
(0.0986) (0.0920) (0.1113) (0.1216) (0.1086)
GSc27 −0.1500∗ 0.0541 0.1143 0.0317 −0.0133
(0.1049) (0.1004) (0.1156) (0.1164) (0.0895)
BOSu20 −0.0552 0.0514 −0.0335 0.0735 0.5424∗∗∗
(0.1100) (0.0424) (0.1034) (0.1222) (0.1704)
BOSu13 0.1949∗∗ −0.7892∗∗∗ −0.0188 −0.2290∗ 0.0183
(0.1121) (0.1444) (0.1159) (0.1418) (0.1462)
BOSu27 0.0352 0.0924 −0.1227 −0.0069
(0.1153) (0.1179) (0.1282) (0.1693)
BOSc20 −0.0564 −0.1179 0.0850 0.2496∗∗ −0.2476∗
(0.1241) (0.0986) (0.1661) (0.1207) (0.1722)
BOSc13 0.0046 −0.1086 0.0942 −0.1684 0.1451
(0.1284) (0.1231) (0.1304) (0.1609) (0.1498)
BOSc27 0.1736 −0.1907∗∗∗ 0.2034∗ −0.1538 −0.2656∗
(0.1578) (0.1352) (0.1285) (0.1249) (0.1173)
Table 12: Probit ML estimation results on how risk aversion aﬀects behavior in the matching market. In case the payoﬀ
of school 2 is 13 or 27ECU, we controlled for the behavior in the matching markets played until that point. Errors are
robust to heteroskedasticity. ∗ Signiﬁcant at the 10–percent level. ∗∗ Signiﬁcant at the 5–percent level. ∗∗∗ Signiﬁcant at
the 1–percent level.
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